Εμφάνιση αναρτήσεων με ετικέτα Project Romanticism. Εμφάνιση όλων των αναρτήσεων
Εμφάνιση αναρτήσεων με ετικέτα Project Romanticism. Εμφάνιση όλων των αναρτήσεων

Σάββατο 28 Νοεμβρίου 2009

Project Romanticism: Friedrich Schlegel


Friedrich Schlegel

(1772 – 1829)


Αποσπάσματα


Η ρομαντική ποίηση είναι προοδευτική οικουμενική ποίηση. Προορισμός της δεν είναι μόνο να ενώσει πάλι όλα τα μεμονωμένα είδη ποίησης και να εμπλουτίσει την ποίηση με φιλοσοφία και ρητορική. Θέλει και οφείλει να συγχωνεύσει ποίηση και πρόζα, μεγαλοφυΐα και κριτική, τεχνητό και φυσικό ύφος στην ποίηση, να δώσει στην ποίηση ζωντάνια και συντροφικότητα, να κάνει τη ζωή και την κοινωνία ποιητική, να εμφυσήσει ποίηση στο ευφυολόγημα, να διαποτίσει με ευδόκιμο παιδευτικό υλικό πάσης φύσεως κάθε μορφή τέχνης μέχρι κορεσμού και να αναταράξει την τέχνη με τις δονήσεις τους χιούμορ. Στους κόλπους της εγκλείει όλα αυτά που μπορούν να αποτελέσουν ποίηση, από τα μεγαλύτερα συστήματα τέχνης, τα οποία περιλαμβάνουν μέσα τους και άλλα επιπλέον συστήματα, μέχρι και τον λυγμό, το φιλί που αποπνέει το παιδί στο άτεχνο τραγούδι του. Έχει τη δυνατότητα να χάνεται στην αναπαράσταση της με τέτοιο τρόπο έτσι ώστε να πιστεύει κανείς ότι ο χαρακτηρισμός κάθε λογής ποιητικών υποκειμένων είναι για εκείνη το εν και το παν. Και όμως δεν υπάρχει ακόμα καμία μορφή η οποία έχει φτιαχτεί για να εκφράζει απόλυτα το πνεύμα του συγγραφέα, έτσι ώστε ορισμένοι καλλιτέχνες, που απλώς και μόνο ήθελαν να γράψουν ένα μυθιστόρημα, το μόνο που κατάφεραν ήταν να δώσουν σε μεγαλύτερο ή μικρότερο βαθμό μια περιγραφή του εαυτού τους.

Μόνο αυτή μπορεί ταυτόχρονα να παράγει από το έπος έναν καθρέφτη όλου του κόσμου. Και όμως, περισσότερο από ο,τιδήποτε άλλο, έχει τη δυνατότητα να αμφιταλαντεύεται ανάμεσα στο υποκείμενο και το αντικείμενο της αναπαράστασης, ελεύθερη από κάθε πραγματικό ή ιδεατό ενδιαφέρον, πάνω στις φτερούγες του ποιητικού στοχασμού και να βρίσκεται μετέωρη ενδιάμεσα, να καθιστά δυνατό τον αναστοχασμό πάντοτε εκ νέου και να τον πολλαπλασιάζει σε μία σειρά από καθρέφτες. Είναι ικανή να προσφέρει την πιο υψηλή και πολύπλευρη παιδεία, όχι μόνο από μέσα προς τα έξω, αλλά και από έξω προς τα μέσα, οργανώνοντας ισομερώς όλα τα μέλη του κάθε οργανισμού, όπως οφείλει να διάκειται το όλο απέναντι στα παράγωγα του, έτσι ώστε να επιτρέπει τη διάνοιξη της προοπτικής μιας αναπτυσσόμενης κλασικότητας χωρίς όρια. Η ρομαντική τέχνη ορθώνεται ανάμεσα στις τέχνες όπως το ευφυολόγημα απέναντι στη φιλοσοφία. Σημαίνει τόσα για τη ζωή όσα και η κοινωνία, οι συναναστροφές, η φιλία και η αγάπη. Ό λα τα είδη ποίηση είναι πλέον ξεπερασμένα και μπορούν τώρα πια να υποβληθούν σε ανατομία. Το είδος της ρομαντικής ποίησης βρίσκεται ακόμα υπό εξέλιξη. Και η αληθινή ουσία της συνίσταται ακριβώς στο ότι μπορεί να εξελίσσεται εις τον αιώνα των αιώνων χωρίς να ολοκληρώνεται ποτέ. Δεν πρόκειται ποτέ να αναιρεθεί από κάποια θεωρία και μόνο στο πλαίσιο μιας θεϊκά εμπνευσμένης κριτικής θα επιτρεπόταν να αποτολμήσει κανείς έναν χαρακτηρισμό του ιδανικού της. Μόνο αυτή είναι άπειρη, επειδή μόνο αυτή είναι ελεύθερη, αναγνωρίζοντας ως πρώτο κανόνα της ότι η αυθαιρεσία του ποιητή δεν επιδέχεται κανέναν κανόνα. Η ρομαντική ποίηση είναι η μόνη που είναι κάτι παραπάνω από είδος και είναι παράλληλα η ίδια η ποιητική τέχνη, διότι κατά μία έννοια κάθε ποίηση είναι ή οφείλει να είναι ρομαντική.

Athenäum, Fragmente 116



Οικουμενικότητα σημαίνει αμοιβαίος κορεσμός όλων των μορφών και των υλικών. Η αρμονία θα επιτευχθεί μόνο μέσω της σύνδεσης ποίησης και φιλοσοφίας, καθώς ακόμα και στα πιο ολοκληρωμένα οικουμενικά έργα της μέχρι τώρα απομονωμένης ποίησης και φιλοσοφίας φαίνεται να λείπει αυτή η σύνθεση. Όσον αφορά την αρμονία παραμένουν ακόμα ανολοκλήρωτα. Η ζωή του οικουμενικού πνεύματος είναι μια αδιάκοπη αλυσίδα εσωτερικών επαναστάσεων· όλα τα άτομα, τα πρωταρχικά, τα αιώνια, ζουν δηλαδή μέσα σ’ αυτό. Πρόκειται στ’ αλήθεια για έναν πολυθεϊστή που φέρει ολόκληρο τον Όλυμπο μέσα του.

Athenäum, Fragmente 451



Κάθε έννοια του Θεού είναι κενή φλυαρία. Όμως η ιδέα της θεότητας είναι η ιδέα των ιδεών.

Ideen, 15

Οι εμπειριστές είναι οι οικονόμοι της φιλοσοφίας.

Aus den Heften zur Philosophie [1794 – 1818], [II] Philosophische Fragmente. Erse Epoche. II, 911


Μονάχα στο εξωτερικό τους οι μάσκες είναι εθνικές, το εσωτερικό τους παραμένει οικουμενικό.

Aus den Heften zur Poesie und Literatur [1796 – 1801], [IX], 176



Από τη ρομαντική σκοπιά όλα τα παρακλάδια της ποίησης, ακόμα και τα πιο εκκεντρικά και αλλοπρόσαλλα, κερδίζουν την αξία τους ως προπαιδευτικό υλικό της οικουμενικότητας, εφόσον βέβαια υπάρχει κάτι σ’ αυτά, εφόσον βέβαια είναι αυθεντικά.

Athenäum, Fragmente 139



Ένας ορισμός της ποίησης μπορεί μονάχα να ορίσει τι οφείλει αυτή να είναι, όχι όμως αυτό που είναι και ήταν στην πραγματικότητα. Αλλιώς θα έλεγε κανείς εν συντομία: ποίηση είναι αυτό που έχει ονομάσει κανείς ποίηση σε κάποια χρονική περίοδο, σε κάποιον τόπο.

Athenäum, Fragmente 114



Όλα τα κλασικά είδη ποίησης στην αυστηρή τους καθαρότητα είναι πια αστεία.

Kritische Fragmente, 60



Ένας πραγματικά ελεύθερος και καλλιεργημένος άνθρωπος θα όφειλε, σύμφωνα με την προσωπική του αρέσκεια, να διάκειται απέναντι στη φιλοσοφία και τη φιλολογία, την ποίηση και την κριτική, την ιστορία και την ρητορική, την αρχαιότητα και την σύγχρονη εποχή, εντελώς αυθαίρετα, όπως κουρδίζει κανείς ένα όργανο, ανά πάσα στιγμή και σε οποιαδήποτε κλίμακα.

Kritische Fragmente, 55



Όλες οι μορφές, ακόμα και οι πιο αλλόκοτες, οφείλουν να επανέλθουν και να προσλάβουν μία καινούργια σημασία.

Aus den Heften zur Poesie und Literatur [1796 – 1801], [V], 343



Το ότι τα πάντα οφείλουν να γίνουν τέχνη ανήκει στη φιλοσοφία της πράξης.

Aus den Heften zur Poesie und Literatur [1796 – 1801], [V], 227



Μέσω των καλλιτεχνών υψώνεται η ανθρωπότητα σε ένα άτομο, καθώς αυτοί επιτελούν τη συνένωση μέλλοντος και παρελθόντος κόσμου στο παρόν, αποτελώντας το υψηλότερο ψυχικό όργανο στο οποίο συναντώνται τα πνεύματα ολόκληρου του εξωτερικού κόσμου για να επιδράσουν έπειτα στον εσωτερικό.

Ideen, 64



Καλλιτέχνης μπορεί να είναι μόνο εκείνος ο οποίος έχει τη δική του θρησκεία, μια αυθεντική εικόνα του άπειρου.

Ideen, 13



Όλοι οι άνθρωποι είναι κάπως αστείοι και παράξενοι μόνο και μόνο επειδή είναι άνθρωποι· κι από αυτή τη σκοπιά επίσης είναι οι καλλιτέχνες δύο φορές άνθρωποι. Έτσι ήταν, έτσι είναι και έτσι θα συνεχίσει να είναι.

Ideen, 145


Η σχέση μου με τους μεγάλους φιλοσόφους είναι σαν αυτή του Πλάτωνα με τους Σπαρτιάτες. Τους αγαπούσε και τους εκτιμούσε απεριόριστα, αλλά είχε πάντα να λέει γι αυτούς ότι έμειναν σε όλα στα μισά του δρόμου.

Athenäum, Fragmente 48



Όσο πιο πολλά ξέρει κανείς, τόσο πιο πολλά έχει ακόμα να μάθει. Με την γνώση αυξάνεται στον ίδιο βαθμό και η άγνοια ή, πολύ περισσότερο, η γνώση της άγνοιας.

Athenäum, Fragmente 267



Ένας αληθινός συγγραφέας γράφει για όλους ή για κανέναν. Αυτός που γράφει για τον έναν ή τον άλλον το μόνο που καταφέρνει είναι να μην διαβάζεται.

Kritische Fragmente, 85


***


Το απάνθισμα αυτό των αποσπασμάτων του Friedrich Schlegel προέρχεται από το βιβλίο Το ρομαντικό απόσπασμα. Μια επιλογή κειμένων του πρώιμου ρομαντισμού, επιλογή – μετάφραση – επιμέλεια Μ. Περράκης, Futura, Αθήνα, 2003.


Κυριακή 7 Ιουνίου 2009

Project Romanticism



Samuel Taylor Coleridge

(1772 – 1834)



On Poesy or Art

(1818)


MAN communicates by articulation of sounds, and paramountly by the memory in the ear; nature by the impression of bounds and surfaces on the eye, and through the eye it gives significance and appropriation, and thus the conditions of memory, or the capability of being remembered, to sounds, smells, etc. Now Art, used collectively for painting, sculpture, architecture, and music, is the mediatress between, and reconciler of nature and man. It is, therefore, the power of humanizing nature, of infusing the thoughts and passions of man into everything which is the object of his contemplation; color, form, motion, and sound, are the elements which it combines, and it stamps them into unity in the mould of a moral idea.

The primary art is writing;—primary, if we regard the purpose abstracted from the different modes of realizing it, those steps of progression of which the instances are still visible in the lower degrees of civilization. First, there is mere gesticulation; then rosaries or wampum; then picture-language; then hieroglyphics, and finally alphabetic letters. These all consist of a translation of man into nature, of a substitution of the visible for the audible.

The so-called music of savage tribes as little deserves the name of art for the understanding as the ear warrants it for music. Its lowest state is a mere expression of passion by sounds which the passion itself necessitates;—the highest amounts to no more than a voluntary reproduction of these sounds in the absence of the occasioning causes, so as to give the pleasure of contrast—for example, by the various outcries of battle in the song of security and triumph. Poetry also is purely human; for all its materials are from the mind, and all its products are for the mind. But it is the apotheosis of the former state, in which by excitement of the associative power passion itself imitates order, and the order resulting produces a pleasurable passion, and thus it elevates the mind by making its feelings the object of its reflection. So likewise, while it recalls the sights and sounds that had accompanied the occasions of the original passions, poetry impregnates them with an interest not their own by means of the passions, and yet tempers the passion by the calming power which all distinct images exert on the human soul. In this way poetry is the preparation for art, inasmuch as it avails itself of the forms of nature to recall, to express, and to modify the thoughts and feelings of the mind.

Still, however, poetry can only act through the intervention of articulate speech, which is so peculiarly human that in all languages it constitutes the ordinary phrase by which man and nature are contradistinguished. It is the original force of the word “brute,” and even “mute” and “dumb” do not convey the absence of sound, but the absence of articulated sounds.

As soon as the human mind is intelligibly addressed by an outward image exclusively of articulate speech, so soon does art commence. But please to observe that I have laid particular stress on the words “human mind”—meaning to exclude thereby all results common to man and all other sentient creatures, and consequently confining myself to the effect produced by the congruity of the animal impression with the reflective powers of the mind; so that not the thing presented, but that which is re-presented by the thing, shall be the source of the pleasure. In this sense nature itself is to a religious observer the art of God; and for the same cause art itself might be defined as of a middle quality between a thought and a thing, or as I said before, the union and reconciliation of that which is nature with that which is exclusively human. It is the figured language of thought, and is distinguished from nature by the unity of all the parts in one thought or idea. Hence nature itself would give us the impression of a work of art, if we could see the thought which is present at once in the whole and in every part; and a work of art will be just in proportion as it adequately conveys the thought, and rich in proportion to the variety of parts which it holds in unity.

If, therefore, the term “mute” be taken as opposed not to sound but to articulate speech, the old definition of painting will in fact be the true and best definition of the fine arts in general, that is, muta poesis, mute poesy, and so of course poesy. And, as all languages perfect themselves by a gradual process of desynonymizing words originally equivalent, I have cherished the wish to use the word “poesy” as the generic or common term, and to distinguish that species of poesy which is not muta poesis by its usual name “poetry”; while of all the other species which collectively form the fine arts, there would remain this as the common definition—that they all, like poetry, are to express intellectual purposes, thoughts, conceptions, and sentiments which have their origin in the human mind—not, however, as poetry does, by means of articulate speech, but as nature or the divine art does, by form, color, magnitude, proportion, or by sound, that is, silently or musically.

Well! it may be said—but who has ever thought otherwise? We all know that art is the imitatress of nature. And, doubtless, the truths which I hope to convey would be barren truisms, if all men meant the same by the words “imitate” and “nature.” But it would be flattering mankind at large, to presume that such is the fact. First, to imitate. The impression on the wax is not an imitation, but a copy, of the seal; the seal itself is an imitation. But, further, in order to form a philosophic conception, we must seek for the kind, as the heat in ice, invisible light, etc., whilst, for practical purposes, we must have reference to the degree. It is sufficient that philosophically we understand that in all imitation two elements must coexist, and not only coexist, but must be perceived as coexisting. These two constituent elements are likeness and unlikeness, or sameness and difference, and in all genuine creations of art there must be a union of these disparates. The artist may take his point of view where he pleases, provided that the desired effect be perceptibly produced—that there be likeness in the difference, difference in the likeness, and a reconcilement of both in one. If there be likeness to nature without any check of difference, the result is disgusting, and the more complete the delusion, the more loathsome the effect. Why are such simulations of nature, as wax-work figures of men and women, so disagreeable? Because not finding the motion and the life which we expected, we are shocked as by a falsehood, every circumstance of detail, which before induced us to be interested, making the distance from truth more palpable. You set out with a supposed reality and are disappointed and disgusted with the deception; while, in respect to a work of genuine imitation, you begin with an acknowledged total difference, and then every touch of nature gives you the pleasure of an approximation to truth. The fundamental principle of all this is undoubtedly the horror of falsehood and the love of truth inherent in the human breast. The Greek tragic dance rested on these principles, and I can deeply sympathize in imagination with the Greeks in this favorite part of their theatrical exhibitions, when I call to mind the pleasure I felt in beholding the combat of the Horatii and Curiatii most exquisitely danced in Italy to the music of Cimarosa.

Secondly, as to nature. We must imitate nature! yes, but what in nature—all and everything? No, the beautiful in nature. And what then is the beautiful? What is beauty? It is, in the abstract, the unity of the manifold, the coalescence of the diverse; in the concrete, it is the union of the shapely (formosum) with the vital. In the dead organic it depends on regularity of form, the first and lowest species of which is the triangle with all its modifications, as in crystals, architecture, etc.; in the living organic it is not mere regularity of form, which would produce a sense of formality; neither is it subservient to anything beside itself. If may be present in a disagreeable object, in which the proportion of the parts constitutes a whole; it does not arise from association, as the agreeable does, but sometimes lies in the rupture of association; it is not different to different individuals and nations, as has been said, nor is it connected with the ideas of the good, or the fit, or the useful. The sense of beauty is intuitive, and beauty itself is all that inspires pleasure without, and aloof from, and even contrarily to, interest.

If the artist copies the mere nature, the natura naturata, what idle rivalry! If he proceeds only from a given form, which is supposed to answer to the notion of beauty, what an emptiness, what an unreality there always is in his productions, as in Cipriani’s pictures! Believe me, you must master the essence, the natura naturans, which presupposes a bond between nature in the higher sense and the soul of man.

The wisdom in nature is distinguished from that in man by the co-instantaneity of the plan and the execution; the thought and the product are one, or are given at once; but there is no reflex act, and hence there is no moral responsibility. In man there is reflection, freedom, and choice; he is, therefore, the head of the visible creation. In the objects of nature are presented, as in a mirror, all the possible elements, steps, and processes of intellect antecedent to consciousness, and therefore to the full development of the intelligential act; and man’s mind is the very focus of all the rays of intellect which are scattered throughout the images of nature. Now, so to place these images, totalized and fitted to the limits of the human mind, as to elicit from, and to superinduce upon, the forms themselves the moral reflections to which they approximate, to make the external internal, the internal external, to make nature thought, and thought nature—this is the mystery of genius in the fine arts. Dare I add that the genius must act on the feeling, that body is but a striving to become mind—that it is mind in its essence?

In every work of art there is a reconcilement of the external with the internal; the conscious is so impressed on the unconscious as to appear in it; as compared mere letters inscribed on a tomb with figures themselves constituting the tomb. He who combines the two is the man of genius; and for that reason he must partake of both. Hence there is in genius itself an unconscious activity; nay, that is the genius in the man of genius. And this is the true exposition of the rule that the artist must first eloign himself from nature in order to return to her with full effect. Why this? Because if he were to begin by mere painful copying, he would produce masks only, not forms breathing life. He must out of his own mind create forms according to the severe laws of the intellect, in order to generate in himself that co-ordination of freedom and law, that involution of obedience in the prescript, and of prescript in the impulse to obey, which assimilates him to nature, and enables him to understand her. He merely absents himself for a season from her, that his own spirit, which has the same ground with nature, may learn her unspoken language in its main radicals, before he approaches to her endless compositions of them. Yes, not to acquire cold notions—lifeless technical rules—but living and life-producing ideas, which shall contain their own evidence, the certainty that they are essentially one with the germinal causes in nature—his consciousness being the focus and mirror of both—for this does the artist for a time abandon the external real in order to return to it with a complete sympathy with its internal and actual. For of all we see, hear, feel, and touch the substance is and must be in ourselves; and therefore there is no alternative in reason between the dreary (and thank heaven! almost impossible) belief that everything around us is but a phantom, or that the life which is in us is in them likewise; and that to know is to resemble, when we speak of objects out of ourselves, even as within ourselves to learn is, according to Plato, only to recollect;—the only effective answer to which, that I have been fortunate to meet with, is that which Pope has consecrated for future use in the line—

“And coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin!”

The artist must imitate that which is within the thing, that which is active through form and figure, and discourses to us by symbols—the Natur-geist, or spirit of nature, as we unconsciously imitate those whom we love; for so only can he hope to produce any work truly natural in the object and truly human in the effect. The idea which puts the form together cannot itself be the form. It is above form, and is its essence, the universal in the individual, or the individuality itself—the glance and the exponent of the indwelling power.

Each thing that lives has its moment of self-exposition, and so has each period of each thing, if we remove the disturbing forces of accident. To do this is the business of ideal art, whether in images of childhood, youth, or age, in man or in woman. Hence a good portrait is the abstract of the personal; it is not the likeness for actual comparison, but for recollection. This explains why the likeness of a very good portrait is not always recognized; because some persons never abstract, and among these are especially to be numbered the near relations and friends of the subject, in consequence of the constant pressure and check exercised on their minds by the actual presence of the original. And each thing that only appears to live has also its possible position of relation to life, as nature herself testifies, who, where she cannot be, prophesies her being in the crystallized metal, or the inhaling plant.

The charm, the indispensable requisite, of sculpture is unity of effect. But painting rests in a material remoter from nature, and its compass is therefore greater. Light and shade give external, as well internal, being even with all its accidents, while sculpture is confined to the latter. And here I may observe that the subjects chosen for works of art, whether in sculpture or painting, should be such as really are capable of being expressed and conveyed within the limits of those arts. Moreover, they ought to be such as will affect the spectator by their truth, their beauty, or their sublimity, and therefore they may be addressed to the judgment, the senses, or the reason. The peculiarity of the impression which they may make may be derived either from color and form, or from proportion and fitness, or from the excitement of the moral feelings; or all these may be combined. Such works as do combine these sources of effect must have the preference in dignity.

Imitation of the antique may be too exclusive, and may produce an injurious effect on modern sculpture:—first, generally, because such an imitation cannot fail to have a tendency to keep the attention fixed on externals rather than on the thought within;—secondly, because, accordingly, it leads the artist to rest satisfied with that which is always imperfect, namely, bodily form, and circumscribes, his views of mental expression to the ideas of power and grandeur only;—thirdly, because it induces an effort to combine together two incongruous things, that is to say, modern feelings in antique forms;—fourthly, because it speaks in a language, as it were, learned and dead; the tones of which, being unfamiliar, leave the common spectator cold and unimpressed;—and lastly, because it necessarily causes a neglect of thoughts, emotions, and images of profounder interest and more exalted dignity, as motherly, sisterly, and brotherly love, piety, devotion, the divine become human—the Virgin, the Apostle, the Christ. The artist’s principle in the statue of a great man should be the illustration of departed merit; and I cannot but think that a skilful adoption of modern habiliments would, in many instances, give a variety and force of effect which a bigoted adherence to Greek or Roman costume precludes. It is, I believe, from artists finding Greek models unfit for several important modern purposes that we see so many allegorical figures on monuments and elsewhere. Painting was, as it were, a new art, and being unshackled by old models it chose its own subjects, and took an eagle’s flight. And a new field seems opened for modern sculpture in the symbolical expression of the ends of life, as in Guy’s monument, Chantrey’s children in Worcester Cathedral, etc.

Architecture exhibits the greatest extent of the difference from nature which may exist in works of art. It involves all the powers of design, and is sculpture and painting inclusively. It shows the greatness of man, and should at the same time teach him humility.

Music is the most entirely human of the fine arts, and has the fewest analoga in nature. Its first delightfulness is simple accordance with the ear; but it is an associated thing, and recalls the deep emotions of the past with an intellectual sense of proportion. Every human feeling is greater and larger than the exciting cause—a proof, I think, that man is designed for a higher state of existence; and this is deeply implied in music in which there is always something more and beyond the immediate expression.

With regard to works in all the branches of the fine arts, I may remark that the pleasure arising from novelty must of course be allowed its due place and weight. This pleasure consists in the identity of two opposite elements—that is to say, sameness and variety. If in the midst of the variety there be not some fixed object for the attention, the unceasing succession of the variety will prevent the mind from observing the difference of the individual objects; and the only thing remaining will be the succession, which will then produce precisely the same effect as sameness. This we experience when we let the trees or hedges pass before the fixed eye during a rapid movement in a carriage, or, on the other hand, when we suffer a file of soldiers or ranks of men in procession to go on before us without resting the eye on anyone in particular. In order to derive pleasure from the occupation of the mind, the principle of unity must always be present, so that in the midst of the multeity the cetripetal force be never suspended, nor the sense be fatigued by the predominance of the centrifugal force. This unity in multeity I have elsewhere stated as the principle of beauty. It is equally the source of pleasure in variety, and in fact a higher term including both. What is the seclusive or distinguishing term between them?

Remember that there is a difference between form as proceeding, and shape as superinduced;—the latter is either the death or the imprisonment of the thing;—the former is its self-witnessing and self-effected sphere of agency. Art would or should be the abridgment of nature. Now the fullness of nature is without character, as water is purest when without taste, smell, or color; but this is the highest, the apex only—it is not the whole. The object of art is to give the whole ad hominem; hence each step of nature hath its ideal, and hence the possibility of a climax up to the perfect form of a harmonized chaos.

To the idea of life victory or strife is necessary; as virtue consists not simply in the absence of vices, but in the overcoming of them. So it is in beauty. The sight of what is subordinated and conquered heightens the strength and the pleasure; and this should be exhibited by the artist either inclusively in his figure, or else out of it, and beside it to act by way of supplement and contrast. And with a view to this, remark the seeming identity of body and mind in infants, and thence the loveliness of the former; the commencing separation in boyhood, and the struggle of equilibrium in youth: thence onward the body is first simply indifferent; then demanding the translucency of the mind not to be worse than indifferent; and finally all that presents the body as body becoming almost of an excremental nature.


Κυριακή 3 Μαΐου 2009

Project Romanticism



Friedrich von Schiller

(1759 – 1805)



On the Sublime

(1801)



"Man is never obliged to say, I must--must," says the Jew Nathan to the dervish;

and this expression is true in a wider sense than man might be tempted to

suppose. The will is the specific character of man, and reason itself is

only the eternal rule of his will. All nature acts reasonably; all our

prerogative is to act reasonably, with consciousness and with will. All

other objects obey necessity; man is the being who wills.

It is exactly for this reason that there is nothing more inconsistent

with the dignity of man than to suffer violence, for violence effaces

him. He who does violence to us disputes nothing less than our humanity;

he who submits in a cowardly spirit to the violence abdicates his quality

of man. But this pretension to remain absolutely free from all that is

violence seems to imply a being in possession of a force sufficiently

great to keep off all other forces. But if this pretension is found in a

being who, in the order of forces, cannot claim the first rank, the

result is an unfortunate contradiction between his instinct and his

power.

Man is precisely in this case. Surrounded by numberless forces, which

are all superior to him and hold sway over him, he aspires by his nature

not to have to suffer any injury at their hands. It is true that by his

intelligence he adds artificially to his natural forces, and that up to a

certain point he actually succeeds in reigning physically over everything

that is physical. The proverb says, "there is a remedy for everything

except death;" but this exception, if it is one in the strictest

acceptation of the term, would suffice to entirely ruin the very idea of

our nature. Never will man be the cause that wills, if there is a case,

a single case, in which, with or without his consent, he is forced to

what he does not wish. This single terrible exception, to be or to do

what is necessary and not what he wishes, this idea will pursue him as a

phantom; and as we see in fact among the greater part of men, it will

give him up a prey to the blind terrors of imagination. His boasted

liberty is nothing, if there is a single point where he is under

constraint and bound. It is education that must give back liberty to

man, and help him to complete the whole idea of his nature. It ought,

therefore, to make him capable of making his will prevail, for, I repeat

it, man is the being who wills.

It is possible to reach this end in two ways: either really, by opposing

force to force, by commanding nature, as nature yourself; or by the idea,

issuing from nature, and by thus destroying in relation to self the very

idea of violence. All that helps man really to hold sway over nature is

what is styled physical education. Man cultivates his understanding and

develops his physical force, either to convert the forces of nature,

according to their proper laws, into the instruments of his will, or to

secure himself against their effects when he cannot direct them. But the

forces of nature can only be directed or turned aside up to a certain

point; beyond that point they withdraw from the influence of man and

place him under theirs.

Thus beyond the point in question his freedom would be lost, were he only

susceptible of physical education. But he must be man in the full sense

of the term, and consequently he must have nothing to endure, in any

case, contrary to his will. Accordingly, when he can no longer oppose to

the physical forces any proportional physical force, only one resource

remains to him to avoid suffering any violence: that is, to cause to

cease entirely that relation which is so fatal to him. It is, in short,

to annihilate as an idea the violence he is obliged to suffer in fact.

The education that fits man for this is called moral education.

The man fashioned by moral education, and he only, is entirely free. He

is either superior to nature as a power, or he is in harmony with her.

None of the actions that she brings to bear upon him is violence, for

before reaching him it has become an act of his own will, and dynamic

nature could never touch him, because he spontaneously keeps away from

all to which she can reach. But to attain to this state of mind, which

morality designates as resignation to necessary things, and religion

styles absolute submission to the counsels of Providence, to reach this

by an effort of his free will and with reflection, a certain clearness is

required in thought, and a certain energy in the will, superior to what

man commonly possesses in active life. Happily for him, man finds here

not only in his rational nature a moral aptitude that can be developed by

the understanding, but also in his reasonable and sensible nature--that

is, in his human nature--an aesthetic tendency which seems to have been

placed there expressly: a faculty awakens of itself in the presence of

certain sensuous objects, and which, after our feelings are purified, can

be cultivated to such a point as to become a powerful ideal development.

This aptitude, I grant, is idealistic in its principle and in its

essence, but one which even the realist allows to be seen clearly enough

in his conduct, though he does not acknowledge this in theory. I am now

about to discuss this faculty.

I admit that the sense of the beautiful, when it is developed by culture,

suffices of itself even to make us, in a certain sense, independent of

nature as far as it is a force. A mind that has ennobled itself

sufficiently to be more sensible of the form than of the matter of

things, contains in itself a plenitude of existence that nothing could

make it lose, especially as it does not trouble itself about the

possession of the things in question, and finds a very liberal pleasure

in the mere contemplation of the phenomenon. As this mind has no want to

appropriate the objects in the midst of which it lives, it has no fear of

being deprived of them. But it is nevertheless necessary that these

phenomena should have a body, through which they manifest themselves;

and, consequently, as long as we feel the want even only of finding a

beautiful appearance or a beautiful phenomenon, this want implies that of

the existence of certain objects; and it follows that our satisfaction

still depends on nature, considered as a force, because it is nature who

disposes of all existence in a sovereign manner. It is a different

thing, in fact, to feel in yourself the want of objects endowed with

beauty and goodness, or simply to require that the objects which surround

us are good and beautiful. This last desire is compatible with the most

perfect freedom of the soul; but it is not so with the other. We are

entitled to require that the object before us should be beautiful and

good, but we can only wish that the beautiful and the good should be

realized objectively before us. Now the disposition of mind is, par

excellence, called grand and sublime, in which no attention is given to

the question of knowing if the beautiful, the good, and the perfect

exist; but when it is rigorously required that that which exists should

be good, beautiful and perfect, this character of mind is called sublime,

because it contains in it positively all the characteristics of a fine

mind without sharing its negative features. A sign by which beautiful

and good minds, but having weaknesses, are recognized, is the aspiring

always to find their moral ideal realized in the world of facts, and

their being painfully affected by all that places an obstacle to it. A

mind thus constituted is reduced to a sad state of dependence in relation

to chance, and it may always be predicted of it, without fear of

deception, that it will give too large a share to the matter in moral and

aesthetical things, and that it will not sustain the more critical trials

of character and taste. Moral imperfections ought not to be to us a

cause of suffering and of pain: suffering and pain bespeak rather an

ungratified wish than an unsatisfied moral want. An unsatisfied moral

want ought to be accompanied by a more manly feeling, and fortify our

mind and confirm it in its energy rather than make us unhappy and

pusillanimous.

Nature has given to us two genii as companions in our life in this lower

world. The one, amiable and of good companionship, shortens the troubles

of the journey by the gayety of its plays. It makes the chains of

necessity light to us, and leads us amidst joy and laughter, to the most

perilous spots, where we must act as pure spirits and strip ourselves of

all that is body, on the knowledge of the true and the practice of duty.

Once when we are there, it abandons us, for its realm is limited to the

world of sense; its earthly wings could not carry it beyond. But at this

moment the other companion steps upon the stage, silent and grave, and

with his powerful arm carries us beyond the precipice that made us giddy.

In the former of these genii we recognize the feeling of the beautiful,

in the other the feeling of the sublime. No doubt the beautiful itself

is already an expression of liberty. This liberty is not the kind that

raises us above the power of nature, and that sets us free from all

bodily influence, but it is only the liberty which we enjoy as men,

without issuing from the limits of nature. In the presence of beauty we

feel ourselves free, because the sensuous instincts are in harmony with

the laws of reason. In presence of the sublime we feel ourselves

sublime, because the sensuous instincts have no influence over the

jurisdiction of reason, because it is then the pure spirit that acts in

us as if it were not absolutely subject to any other laws than its own.

The feeling of the sublime is a mixed feeling. It is at once a painful

state, which in its paroxysm is manifested by a kind of shudder, and a

joyous state, that may rise to rapture, and which, without being properly

a pleasure, is greatly preferred to every kind of pleasure by delicate

souls. This union of two contrary sensations in one and the same feeling

proves in a peremptory manner our moral independence. For as it is

absolutely impossible that the same object should be with us in two

opposite relations, it follows that it is we ourselves who sustain two

different relations with the object. It follows that these two opposed

natures should be united in us, which, on the idea of this object, are

brought into play in two perfectly opposite ways. Thus we experience by

the feeling of the beautiful that the state of our spiritual nature is

not necessarily determined by the state of our sensuous nature; that the

laws of nature are not necessarily our laws; and that there is in us an

autonomous principle independent of all sensuous impressions.

The sublime object may be considered in two lights. We either represent

it to our comprehension, and we try in vain to make an image or idea of

it, or we refer it to our vital force, and we consider it as a power

before which ours is nothing. But though in both cases we experience in

connection with this object the painful feeling of our limits, yet we do

not seek to avoid it; on the contrary we are attracted to it by an

irresistible force. Could this be the case if the limits of our

imagination were at the same time those of our comprehension? Should we

be willingly called back to the feeling of the omnipotence of the forces

of nature if we had not in us something that cannot be a prey of these

forces. We are pleased with the spectacle of the sensuous infinite,

because we are able to attain by thought what the senses can no longer

embrace and what the understanding cannot grasp. The sight of a terrible

object transports us with enthusiasm, because we are capable of willing

what the instincts reject with horror, and of rejecting what they desire.

We willingly allow our imagination to find something in the world of

phenomena that passes beyond it; because, after all, it is only one

sensuous force that triumphs over another sensuous force, but nature,

notwithstanding all her infinity, cannot attain to the absolute grandeur

which is in ourselves. We submit willingly to physical necessity both

our well-being and our existence. This is because the very power reminds

us that there are in us principles that escape its empire. Man is in the

hands of nature, but the will of man is in his own hands.

Nature herself has actually used a sensuous means to teach us that we are

something more than mere sensuous natures. She has even known how to

make use of our sensations to put us on the track of this discovery--that

we are by no means subject as slaves to the violence of the sensations.

And this is quite a different effect from that which can be produced by

the beautiful; I mean the beautiful of the real world, for the sublime

itself is surpassed by the ideal. In the presence of beauty, reason and

sense are in harmony, and it is only on account of this harmony that the

beautiful has attraction for us. Consequently, beauty alone could never

teach us that our destination is to act as pure intelligences, and that

we are capable of showing ourselves such. In the presence of the

sublime, on the contrary, reason and the sensuous are not in harmony, and

it is precisely this contradiction between the two which makes the charm

of the sublime--its irresistible action on our minds. Here the physical

man and the moral man separate in the most marked manner; for it is

exactly in the presence of objects that make us feel at once how limited

the former is that the other makes the experience of its force. The very

thing that lowers one to the earth is precisely that which raises the

other to the infinite.

Let us imagine a man endowed with all the virtues of which the union

constitutes a fine character. Let us suppose a man who finds his delight

in practising justice, beneficence, moderation, constancy, and good

faith. All the duties whose accomplishment is prescribed to him by

circumstances are only a play to him, and I admit that fortune favors him

in such wise that none of the actions which his good heart may demand of

him will be hard to him. Who would not be charmed with such a delightful

harmony between the instincts of nature and the prescriptions of reason?

and who could help admiring such a man? Nevertheless, though he may

inspire us with affection, are we quite sure that he is really virtuous?

Or in general that he has anything that corresponds to the idea of

virtue? If this man had only in view to obtain agreeable sensations,

unless he were mad he could not act in any other possible way; and he

would have to be his own enemy to wish to be vicious. Perhaps the

principle of his actions is pure, but this is a question to be discussed

between himself and his conscience. For our part, we see nothing of it;

we do not see him do anything more than a simply clever man would do who

had no other god than pleasure. Thus all his virtue is a phenomenon that

is explained by reasons derived from the sensuous order, and we are by no

means driven to seek for reasons beyond the world of sense.

Let us suppose that this same man falls suddenly under misfortune. He is

deprived of his possessions; his reputation is destroyed; he is chained

to his bed by sickness and suffering; he is robbed by death of all those

he loves; he is forsaken in his distress by all in whom he had trusted.

Let us under these circumstances again seek him, and demand the practice

of the same virtues under trial as he formerly had practised during the

period of his prosperity. If he is found to be absolutely the same as

before, if his poverty has not deteriorated his benevolence, or

ingratitude his kindly offices of good-will, or bodily suffering his

equanimity, or adversity his joy in the happiness of others; if his

change of fortune is perceptible in externals, but not in his habits, in

the matter, but not in the form of his conduct; then, doubtless, his

virtue could not be explained by any reason drawn from the physical

order; the idea of nature--which always necessarily supposes that actual

phenomena rest upon some anterior phenomenon, as effects upon cause--this

idea no longer suffices to enable us to comprehend this man; because

there is nothing more contradictory than to admit that effect can remain

the same when the cause has changed to its contrary. We must then give

up all natural explanation or thought of finding the reason of his acts

in his condition; we must of necessity go beyond the physical order, and

seek the principle of his conduct in quite another world, to which the

reason can indeed raise itself with its ideas, but which the

understanding cannot grasp by its conceptions. It is this revelation of

the absolute moral power which is subjected to no condition of nature, it

is this which gives to the melancholy feeling that seizes our heart at

the sight of such a man that peculiar, inexpressible charm, which no

delight of the senses, however refined, could arouse in us to the same

extent as the sublime.

Thus the sublime opens to us a road to overstep the limits of the world

of sense, in which the feeling of the beautiful would forever imprison

us. It is not little by little (for between absolute dependence and

absolute liberty there is no possible transition), it is suddenly and by

a shock that the sublime wrenches our spiritual and independent nature

away from the net which feeling has spun round us, and which enchains the

soul the more tightly because of its subtle texture. Whatever may be the

extent to which feeling has gained a mastery over men by the latent

influence of a softening taste, when even it should have succeeded in

penetrating into the most secret recesses of moral jurisdiction under the

deceptive envelope of spiritual beauty, and there poisoning the holiness

of principle at its source--one single sublime emotion often suffices to

break all this tissue of imposture, at one blow to give freedom to the

fettered elasticity of spiritual nature, to reveal its true destination,

and to oblige it to conceive, for one instant at least, the feeling of

its liberty. Beauty, under the shape of the divine Calypso, bewitched

the virtuous son of Ulysses, and the power of her charms held him long a

prisoner in her island. For long he believed he was obeying an immortal

divinity, whilst he was only the slave of sense; but suddenly an

impression of the sublime in the form of Mentor seizes him; he remembers

that he is called to a higher destiny--he throws himself into the waves,

and is free.

The sublime, like the beautiful, is spread profusely throughout nature,

and the faculty to feel both one and the other has been given to all men;

but the germ does not develop equally; it is necessary that art should

lend its aid. The aim of nature supposes already that we ought

spontaneously to advance towards the beautiful, although we still avoid

the sublime: for the beautiful is like the nurse of our childhood, and it

is for her to refine our soul in withdrawing it from the rude state of

nature. But though she is our first affection, and our faculty of

feeling is first developed for her, nature has so provided, nevertheless,

that this faculty ripens slowly and awaits its full development until the

understanding and the heart are formed. If taste attains its full

maturity before truth and morality have been established in our heart by

a better road than that which taste would take, the sensuous world would

remain the limit of our aspirations. We should not know, either in our

ideas or in our feelings, how to pass beyond the world of sense, and all

that imagination failed to represent would be without reality to us. But

happily it enters into the plan of nature, that taste, although it first

comes into bloom, is the last to ripen of all the faculties of the mind.

During this interval, man has time to store up in his mind a provision of

ideas, a treasure of principles in his heart, and then to develop

especially, in drawing from reason, his feeling for the great and the

sublime.

As long as man was only the slave of physical necessity, while he had

found no issue to escape from the narrow circle of his appetites, and

while he as yet felt none of that superior liberty which connects him

with the angels, nature, so far as she is incomprehensible, could not

fail to impress him with the insufficiency of his imagination, and again,

as far as she is a destructive force, to recall his physical

powerlessness. He is forced then to pass timidly towards one, and to

turn away with affright from the other. But scarcely has free

contemplation assured him against the blind oppression of the forces of

nature--scarcely has he recognized amidst the tide of phenomena something

permanent in his own being--than at once the coarse agglomeration of

nature that surrounds him begins to speak in another language to his

heart, and the relative grandeur which is without becomes for him a

mirror in which he contemplates the absolute greatness which is within

himself. He approaches without fear, and with a thrill of pleasure,

those pictures which terrified his imagination, and intentionally makes

an appeal to the whole strength of that faculty by which we represent the

infinite perceived by the senses, in order if she fails in this attempt,

to feel all the more vividly how much these ideas are superior to all

that the highest sensuous faculty can give. The sight of a distant

infinity--of heights beyond vision, this vast ocean which is at his feet,

that other ocean still more vast which stretches above his head,

transport and ravish his mind beyond the narrow circle of the real,

beyond this narrow and oppressive prison of physical life. The simple

majesty of nature offers him a less circumscribed measure for estimating

its grandeur, and, surrounded by the grand outlines which it presents to

him, he can no longer bear anything mean in his way of thinking. Who can

tell how many luminous ideas, how many heroic resolutions, which would

never have been conceived in the dark study of the imprisoned man of

science, nor in the saloons where the people of society elbow each other,

have been inspired on a sudden during a walk, only by the contact and the

generous struggle of the soul with the great spirit of nature? Who knows

if it is not owing to a less frequent intercourse with this sublime

spirit that we must partially attribute the narrowness of mind so common

to the dwellers in towns, always bent under the minutiae which dwarf and

wither their soul, whilst the soul of the nomad remains open and free as

the firmament beneath which he pitches his tent?

But it is not only the unimaginable or the sublime in quantity, it is

also the incomprehensible, that which escapes the understanding and

that which troubles it, which can serve to give us an idea of the

super-sensuous infinity. As soon as this element attains the grandiose

and announces itself to us as the work of nature (for otherwise it is

only despicable), it then aids the soul to represent to itself the ideal,

and imprints upon it a noble development. Who does not love the eloquent

disorder of natural scenery to the insipid regularity of a French garden?

Who does not admire in the plains of Sicily the marvellous combat of

nature with herself--of her creative force and her destructive power?

Who does not prefer to feast his eyes upon the wild streams and

waterfalls of Scotland, upon its misty mountains, upon that romantic

nature from which Ossian drew his inspiration--rather than to grow

enthusiastic in this stiff Holland, before the laborious triumph of

patience over the most stubborn of elements? No one will deny that in

the rich grazing-grounds of Holland, things are not better ordered

for the wants of physical man than upon the perfid crater of Vesuvius,

and that the understanding which likes to comprehend and arrange all

things, does not find its requirements rather in the regularly planted

farm-garden than in the uncultivated beauty of natural scenery. But

man has requirements which go beyond those of natural life and comfort

or well-being; he has another destiny than merely to comprehend the

phenomena which surround him.

In the same manner as for the observant traveller, the strange wildness

of nature is so attractive in physical nature--thus, and for the same

reason, every soul capable of enthusiasm finds even in the regrettable

anarchy found in the moral world a source of singular pleasure. Without

doubt he who sees the grand economy of nature only from the impoverished

light of the understanding; he who has never any other thought than to

reform its defiant disorder and to substitute harmony, such a one could

not find pleasure in a world which seems given up to the caprice of

chance rather than governed according to a wise ordination, and where

merit and fortune are for the most part in opposition. He desires that

the whole world throughout its vast space should be ruled like a house

well regulated; and when this much-desired regularity is not found, he

has no other resource than to defer to a future life, and to another and

better nature, the satisfaction which is his due, but which neither the

present nor the past afford him. On the contrary, he renounces willingly

the pretension of restoring this chaos of phenomena to one single notion;

he regains on another side, and with interest, what he loses on this

side. Just this want of connection, this anarchy, in the phenomena,

making them useless to the understanding, is what makes them valuable to

reason. The more they are disorderly the more they represent the freedom

of nature. In a sense, if you suppress all connection, you have

independence. Thus, under the idea of liberty, reason brings back to

unity of thought that which the understanding could not bring to unity of

notion. It thus shows its superiority over the understanding, as a

faculty subject to the conditions of a sensuous order. When we consider

of what value it is to a rational being to be independent of natural

laws, we see how much man finds in the liberty of sublime objects as a

set-off against the checks of his cognitive faculty. Liberty, with all

its drawbacks, is everywhere vastly more attractive to a noble soul than

good social order without it--than society like a flock of sheep, or a

machine working like a watch. This mechanism makes of man only a

product; liberty makes him the citizen of a better world.

It is only thus viewed that history is sublime to me. The world, as a

historic object, is only the strife of natural forces; with one another

and with man's freedom. History registers more actions referable to

nature than to free will; it is only in a few cases, like Cato and

Phocion, that reason has made its power felt. If we expect a treasury of

knowledge in history how we are deceived! All attempts of philosophy to

reconcile what the moral world demands with what the real world gives is

belied by experience, and nature seems as illogical in history as she is

logical in the organic kingdoms.

But if we give up explanation it is different. Nature, in being

capricious and defying logic, in pulling down great and little, in

crushing the noblest works of man, taking centuries to form--nature, by

deviating from intellectual laws, proves that you cannot explain nature

by nature's laws themselves, and this sight drives the mind to the world

of ideas, to the absolute.

But though nature as a sensuous activity drives us to the ideal, it

throws us still more into the world of ideas by the terrible. Our

highest aspiration is to be in good relations with physical nature,

without violating morality. But it is not always convenient to serve two

masters; and though duty and the appetites should never be at strife,

physical necessity is peremptory, and nothing can save men from evil

destiny. Happy is he who learns to bear what he cannot change! There

are cases where fate overpowers all ramparts, and where the only

resistance is, like a pure spirit, to throw freely off all interest of

sense, and strip yourself of your body. Now this force comes from

sublime emotions, and a frequent commerce with destructive nature.

Pathos is a sort of artificial misfortune, and brings us to the spiritual

law that commands our soul. Real misfortune does not always choose its

time opportunely, while pathos finds us armed at all points. By

frequently renewing this exercise of its own activity the mind controls

the sensuous, so that when real misfortune comes, it can treat it as an

artificial suffering, and make it a sublime emotion. Thus pathos takes

away some of the malignity of destiny, and wards off its blows.

Away then with that false theory which supposes falsely a harmony binding

well being and well doing. Let evil destiny show its face. Our safety

is not in blindness, but in facing our dangers. What can do so better

than familiarity with the splendid and terrible evolution of events, or

than pictures showing man in conflict with chance; evil triumphant,

security deceived--pictures shown us throughout history, and placed

before us by tragedy? Whoever passes in review the terrible fate of

Mithridates, of Syracuse, and Carthage, cannot help keeping his appetite

in check, at least for a time, and, seeing the vanity of things, strive

after that which is permanent. The capacity of the sublime is one of the

noblest aptitudes of man. Beauty is useful, but does not go beyond man.

The sublime applies to the pure spirit. The sublime must be joined to

the beautiful to complete the aesthetic education, and to enlarge man's

heart beyond the sensuous world.

Without the beautiful there would be an eternal strife between our

natural and rational destiny. If we only thought of our vocation as

spirits we should be strangers to this sphere of life. Without the

sublime, beauty would make us forget our dignity. Enervated--wedded to

this transient state, we should lose sight of our true country. We are

only perfect citizens of nature when the sublime is wedded to the

beautiful.

Many things in nature offer man the beautiful and sublime. But here

again he is better served at second-hand. He prefers to have them

ready-made in art rather than seek them painfully in nature. This

instinct for imitation in art has the advantage of being able to make

those points essential that nature has made secondary. While nature

suffers violence in the organic world, or exercises violence, working

with power upon man, though she can only be aesthetical as an object of

pure contemplation, art, plastic art, is fully free, because it throws

off all accidental restrictions and leaves the mind free, because it

imitates the appearance, not the reality of objects. As all sublimity

and beauty consists in the appearance, and not in the value of the object,

it follows that art has all the advantages of nature without her shackles.