Η ρομαντική ποίηση είναι προοδευτική οικουμενική ποίηση. Προορισμός της δεν είναι μόνο να ενώσει πάλι όλα τα μεμονωμένα είδη ποίησης και να εμπλουτίσει την ποίηση με φιλοσοφία και ρητορική. Θέλει και οφείλει να συγχωνεύσει ποίηση και πρόζα, μεγαλοφυΐα και κριτική, τεχνητό και φυσικό ύφος στην ποίηση, να δώσει στην ποίηση ζωντάνια και συντροφικότητα, να κάνει τη ζωή και την κοινωνία ποιητική, να εμφυσήσει ποίηση στο ευφυολόγημα, να διαποτίσει με ευδόκιμο παιδευτικό υλικό πάσης φύσεως κάθε μορφή τέχνης μέχρι κορεσμού και να αναταράξει την τέχνη με τις δονήσεις τους χιούμορ. Στους κόλπους της εγκλείει όλα αυτά που μπορούν να αποτελέσουν ποίηση, από τα μεγαλύτερα συστήματα τέχνης, τα οποία περιλαμβάνουν μέσα τους και άλλα επιπλέον συστήματα, μέχρι και τον λυγμό, το φιλί που αποπνέει το παιδί στο άτεχνο τραγούδι του. Έχει τη δυνατότητα να χάνεται στην αναπαράσταση της με τέτοιο τρόπο έτσι ώστε να πιστεύει κανείς ότι ο χαρακτηρισμός κάθε λογής ποιητικών υποκειμένων είναι για εκείνη το εν και το παν. Και όμως δεν υπάρχει ακόμα καμία μορφή η οποία έχει φτιαχτεί για να εκφράζει απόλυτα το πνεύμα του συγγραφέα, έτσι ώστε ορισμένοι καλλιτέχνες, που απλώς και μόνο ήθελαν να γράψουν ένα μυθιστόρημα, το μόνο που κατάφεραν ήταν να δώσουν σε μεγαλύτερο ή μικρότερο βαθμό μια περιγραφή του εαυτού τους.
Μόνο αυτή μπορεί ταυτόχρονα να παράγει από το έπος έναν καθρέφτη όλου του κόσμου. Και όμως, περισσότερο από ο,τιδήποτε άλλο, έχει τη δυνατότητα να αμφιταλαντεύεται ανάμεσα στο υποκείμενο και το αντικείμενο της αναπαράστασης, ελεύθερη από κάθε πραγματικό ή ιδεατό ενδιαφέρον, πάνω στις φτερούγες του ποιητικού στοχασμού και να βρίσκεται μετέωρη ενδιάμεσα, να καθιστά δυνατό τον αναστοχασμό πάντοτε εκ νέου και να τον πολλαπλασιάζει σε μία σειρά από καθρέφτες. Είναι ικανή να προσφέρει την πιο υψηλή και πολύπλευρη παιδεία, όχι μόνο από μέσα προς τα έξω, αλλά και από έξω προς τα μέσα, οργανώνοντας ισομερώς όλα τα μέλη του κάθε οργανισμού, όπως οφείλει να διάκειται το όλο απέναντι στα παράγωγα του, έτσι ώστε να επιτρέπει τη διάνοιξη της προοπτικής μιας αναπτυσσόμενης κλασικότητας χωρίς όρια. Η ρομαντική τέχνη ορθώνεται ανάμεσα στις τέχνες όπως το ευφυολόγημα απέναντι στη φιλοσοφία. Σημαίνει τόσα για τη ζωή όσα και η κοινωνία, οι συναναστροφές, η φιλία και η αγάπη. Ό λα τα είδη ποίηση είναι πλέον ξεπερασμένα και μπορούν τώρα πια να υποβληθούν σε ανατομία. Το είδος της ρομαντικής ποίησης βρίσκεται ακόμα υπό εξέλιξη. Και η αληθινή ουσία της συνίσταται ακριβώς στο ότι μπορεί να εξελίσσεται εις τον αιώνα των αιώνων χωρίς να ολοκληρώνεται ποτέ. Δεν πρόκειται ποτέ να αναιρεθεί από κάποια θεωρία και μόνο στο πλαίσιο μιας θεϊκά εμπνευσμένης κριτικής θα επιτρεπόταν να αποτολμήσει κανείς έναν χαρακτηρισμό του ιδανικού της. Μόνο αυτή είναι άπειρη, επειδή μόνο αυτή είναι ελεύθερη, αναγνωρίζοντας ως πρώτο κανόνα της ότι η αυθαιρεσία του ποιητή δεν επιδέχεται κανέναν κανόνα. Η ρομαντική ποίηση είναι η μόνη που είναι κάτι παραπάνω από είδος και είναι παράλληλα η ίδια η ποιητική τέχνη, διότι κατά μία έννοια κάθε ποίηση είναι ή οφείλει να είναι ρομαντική.
Athenäum, Fragmente 116
Οικουμενικότητα σημαίνει αμοιβαίος κορεσμός όλων των μορφών και των υλικών. Η αρμονία θα επιτευχθεί μόνο μέσω της σύνδεσης ποίησης και φιλοσοφίας, καθώς ακόμα και στα πιο ολοκληρωμένα οικουμενικά έργα της μέχρι τώρα απομονωμένης ποίησης και φιλοσοφίας φαίνεται να λείπει αυτή η σύνθεση. Όσον αφορά την αρμονία παραμένουν ακόμα ανολοκλήρωτα. Η ζωή του οικουμενικού πνεύματος είναι μια αδιάκοπη αλυσίδα εσωτερικών επαναστάσεων· όλα τα άτομα, τα πρωταρχικά, τα αιώνια, ζουν δηλαδή μέσα σ’ αυτό. Πρόκειται στ’ αλήθεια για έναν πολυθεϊστή που φέρει ολόκληρο τον Όλυμπο μέσα του.
Athenäum, Fragmente 451
Κάθε έννοια του Θεού είναι κενή φλυαρία. Όμως η ιδέα της θεότητας είναι η ιδέα των ιδεών.
Ideen, 15
Οι εμπειριστές είναι οι οικονόμοι της φιλοσοφίας.
Aus den Heften zur Philosophie [1794 – 1818], [II] Philosophische Fragmente. Erse Epoche. II, 911
Μονάχα στο εξωτερικό τους οι μάσκες είναι εθνικές, το εσωτερικό τους παραμένει οικουμενικό.
Aus den Heften zurPoesie und Literatur [1796 – 1801], [IX], 176
Από τη ρομαντική σκοπιά όλα τα παρακλάδια της ποίησης, ακόμα και τα πιο εκκεντρικά και αλλοπρόσαλλα, κερδίζουν την αξία τους ως προπαιδευτικό υλικό της οικουμενικότητας, εφόσον βέβαια υπάρχει κάτι σ’ αυτά, εφόσον βέβαια είναι αυθεντικά.
Athenäum, Fragmente 139
Ένας ορισμός της ποίησης μπορεί μονάχα να ορίσει τι οφείλει αυτή να είναι, όχι όμως αυτό που είναι και ήταν στην πραγματικότητα. Αλλιώς θα έλεγε κανείς εν συντομία: ποίηση είναι αυτό που έχει ονομάσει κανείς ποίηση σε κάποια χρονική περίοδο, σε κάποιον τόπο.
Athenäum, Fragmente 114
Όλα τα κλασικά είδη ποίησης στην αυστηρή τους καθαρότητα είναι πια αστεία.
Kritische Fragmente, 60
Ένας πραγματικά ελεύθερος και καλλιεργημένος άνθρωπος θα όφειλε, σύμφωνα με την προσωπική του αρέσκεια, να διάκειται απέναντι στη φιλοσοφία και τη φιλολογία, την ποίηση και την κριτική, την ιστορία και την ρητορική, την αρχαιότητα και την σύγχρονη εποχή, εντελώς αυθαίρετα, όπως κουρδίζει κανείς ένα όργανο, ανά πάσα στιγμή και σε οποιαδήποτε κλίμακα.
Kritische Fragmente, 55
Όλες οι μορφές, ακόμα και οι πιο αλλόκοτες, οφείλουν να επανέλθουν και να προσλάβουν μία καινούργια σημασία.
Aus den Heften zurPoesie und Literatur [1796 – 1801], [V], 343
Το ότι τα πάντα οφείλουν να γίνουν τέχνη ανήκει στη φιλοσοφία της πράξης.
Aus den Heften zurPoesie und Literatur [1796 – 1801], [V], 227
Μέσω των καλλιτεχνών υψώνεται η ανθρωπότητα σε ένα άτομο, καθώς αυτοί επιτελούν τη συνένωση μέλλοντος και παρελθόντος κόσμου στο παρόν, αποτελώντας το υψηλότερο ψυχικό όργανο στο οποίο συναντώνται τα πνεύματα ολόκληρου του εξωτερικού κόσμου για να επιδράσουν έπειτα στον εσωτερικό.
Ideen, 64
Καλλιτέχνης μπορεί να είναι μόνο εκείνος ο οποίος έχει τη δική του θρησκεία, μια αυθεντική εικόνα του άπειρου.
Ideen, 13
Όλοι οι άνθρωποι είναι κάπως αστείοι και παράξενοι μόνο και μόνο επειδή είναι άνθρωποι· κι από αυτή τη σκοπιά επίσης είναι οι καλλιτέχνες δύο φορές άνθρωποι. Έτσι ήταν, έτσι είναι και έτσι θα συνεχίσει να είναι.
Ideen, 145
Η σχέση μου με τους μεγάλους φιλοσόφους είναι σαν αυτή του Πλάτωνα με τους Σπαρτιάτες. Τους αγαπούσε και τους εκτιμούσε απεριόριστα, αλλά είχε πάντα να λέει γι αυτούς ότι έμειναν σε όλα στα μισά του δρόμου.
Athenäum, Fragmente 48
Όσο πιο πολλά ξέρει κανείς, τόσο πιο πολλά έχει ακόμα να μάθει. Με την γνώση αυξάνεται στον ίδιο βαθμό και η άγνοια ή, πολύ περισσότερο, η γνώση της άγνοιας.
Athenäum, Fragmente 267
Ένας αληθινός συγγραφέας γράφει για όλους ή για κανέναν. Αυτός που γράφει για τον έναν ή τον άλλον το μόνο που καταφέρνει είναι να μην διαβάζεται.
Kritische Fragmente, 85
***
Το απάνθισμα αυτό των αποσπασμάτων του Friedrich Schlegel προέρχεται από το βιβλίο Το ρομαντικό απόσπασμα. Μια επιλογή κειμένων του πρώιμου ρομαντισμού, επιλογή – μετάφραση – επιμέλεια Μ. Περράκης, Futura, Αθήνα, 2003.
MANcommunicates by articulation of sounds, and paramountly by the memory in the ear; nature by the impression of bounds and surfaces on the eye, and through the eye it gives significance and appropriation, and thus the conditions of memory, or the capability of being remembered, to sounds, smells, etc. Now Art, used collectively for painting, sculpture, architecture, and music, is the mediatress between, and reconciler of nature and man. It is, therefore, the power of humanizing nature, of infusing the thoughts and passions of man into everything which is the object of his contemplation; color, form, motion, and sound, are the elements which it combines, and it stamps them into unity in the mould of a moral idea.
The primary art is writing;—primary, if we regard the purpose abstracted from the different modes of realizing it, those steps of progression of which the instances are still visible in the lower degrees of civilization. First, there is mere gesticulation; then rosaries or wampum; then picture-language; then hieroglyphics, and finally alphabetic letters. These all consist of a translation of man into nature, of a substitution of the visible for the audible.
The so-called music of savage tribes as little deserves the name of art for the understanding as the ear warrants it for music. Its lowest state is a mere expression of passion by sounds which the passion itself necessitates;—the highest amounts to no more than a voluntary reproduction of these sounds in the absence of the occasioning causes, so as to give the pleasure of contrast—for example, by the various outcries of battle in the song of security and triumph. Poetry also is purely human; for all its materials are from the mind, and all its products are for the mind. But it is the apotheosis of the former state, in which by excitement of the associative power passion itself imitates order, and the order resulting produces a pleasurable passion, and thus it elevates the mind by making its feelings the object of its reflection. So likewise, while it recalls the sights and sounds that had accompanied the occasions of the original passions, poetry impregnates them with an interest not their own by means of the passions, and yet tempers the passion by the calming power which all distinct images exert on the human soul. In this way poetry is the preparation for art, inasmuch as it avails itself of the forms of nature to recall, to express, and to modify the thoughts and feelings of the mind.
Still, however, poetry can only act through the intervention of articulate speech, which is so peculiarly human that in all languages it constitutes the ordinary phrase by which man and nature are contradistinguished. It is the original force of the word “brute,” and even “mute” and “dumb” do not convey the absence of sound, but the absence of articulated sounds.
As soon as the human mind is intelligibly addressed by an outward image exclusively of articulate speech, so soon does art commence. But please to observe that I have laid particular stress on the words “human mind”—meaning to exclude thereby all results common to man and all other sentient creatures, and consequently confining myself to the effect produced by the congruity of the animal impression with the reflective powers of the mind; so that not the thing presented, but that which is re-presented by the thing, shall be the source of the pleasure. In this sense nature itself is to a religious observer the art of God; and for the same cause art itself might be defined as of a middle quality between a thought and a thing, or as I said before, the union and reconciliation of that which is nature with that which is exclusively human. It is the figured language of thought, and is distinguished from nature by the unity of all the parts in one thought or idea. Hence nature itself would give us the impression of a work of art, if we could see the thought which is present at once in the whole and in every part; and a work of art will be just in proportion as it adequately conveys the thought, and rich in proportion to the variety of parts which it holds in unity.
If, therefore, the term “mute” be taken as opposed not to sound but to articulate speech, the old definition of painting will in fact be the true and best definition of the fine arts in general, that is, muta poesis, mute poesy, and so of course poesy. And, as all languages perfect themselves by a gradual process of desynonymizing words originally equivalent, I have cherished the wish to use the word “poesy” as the generic or common term, and to distinguish that species of poesy which is not muta poesis by its usual name “poetry”; while of all the other species which collectively form the fine arts, there would remain this as the common definition—that they all, like poetry, are to express intellectual purposes, thoughts, conceptions, and sentiments which have their origin in the human mind—not, however, as poetry does, by means of articulate speech, but as nature or the divine art does, by form, color, magnitude, proportion, or by sound, that is, silently or musically.
Well! it may be said—but who has ever thought otherwise? We all know that art is the imitatress of nature. And, doubtless, the truths which I hope to convey would be barren truisms, if all men meant the same by the words “imitate” and “nature.” But it would be flattering mankind at large, to presume that such is the fact. First, to imitate. The impression on the wax is not an imitation, but a copy, of the seal; the seal itself is an imitation. But, further, in order to form a philosophic conception, we must seek for the kind, as the heat in ice, invisible light, etc., whilst, for practical purposes, we must have reference to the degree. It is sufficient that philosophically we understand that in all imitation two elements must coexist, and not only coexist, but must be perceived as coexisting. These two constituent elements are likeness and unlikeness, or sameness and difference, and in all genuine creations of art there must be a union of these disparates. The artist may take his point of view where he pleases, provided that the desired effect be perceptibly produced—that there be likeness in the difference, difference in the likeness, and a reconcilement of both in one. If there be likeness to nature without any check of difference, the result is disgusting, and the more complete the delusion, the more loathsome the effect. Why are such simulations of nature, as wax-work figures of men and women, so disagreeable? Because not finding the motion and the life which we expected, we are shocked as by a falsehood, every circumstance of detail, which before induced us to be interested, making the distance from truth more palpable. You set out with a supposed reality and are disappointed and disgusted with the deception; while, in respect to a work of genuine imitation, you begin with an acknowledged total difference, and then every touch of nature gives you the pleasure of an approximation to truth. The fundamental principle of all this is undoubtedly the horror of falsehood and the love of truth inherent in the human breast. The Greek tragic dance rested on these principles, and I can deeply sympathize in imagination with the Greeks in this favorite part of their theatrical exhibitions, when I call to mind the pleasure I felt in beholding the combat of the Horatii and Curiatii most exquisitely danced in Italy to the music of Cimarosa.
Secondly, as to nature. We must imitate nature! yes, but what in nature—all and everything? No, the beautiful in nature. And what then is the beautiful? What is beauty? It is, in the abstract, the unity of the manifold, the coalescence of the diverse; in the concrete, it is the union of the shapely (formosum) with the vital. In the dead organic it depends on regularity of form, the first and lowest species of which is the triangle with all its modifications, as in crystals, architecture, etc.; in the living organic it is not mere regularity of form, which would produce a sense of formality; neither is it subservient to anything beside itself. If may be present in a disagreeable object, in which the proportion of the parts constitutes a whole; it does not arise from association, as the agreeable does, but sometimes lies in the rupture of association; it is not different to different individuals and nations, as has been said, nor is it connected with the ideas of the good, or the fit, or the useful. The sense of beauty is intuitive, and beauty itself is all that inspires pleasure without, and aloof from, and even contrarily to, interest.
If the artist copies the mere nature, the natura naturata, what idle rivalry! If he proceeds only from a given form, which is supposed to answer to the notion of beauty, what an emptiness, what an unreality there always is in his productions, as in Cipriani’s pictures! Believe me, you must master the essence, the natura naturans, which presupposes a bond between nature in the higher sense and the soul of man.
The wisdom in nature is distinguished from that in man by the co-instantaneity of the plan and the execution; the thought and the product are one, or are given at once; but there is no reflex act, and hence there is no moral responsibility. In man there is reflection, freedom, and choice; he is, therefore, the head of the visible creation. In the objects of nature are presented, as in a mirror, all the possible elements, steps, and processes of intellect antecedent to consciousness, and therefore to the full development of the intelligential act; and man’s mind is the very focus of all the rays of intellect which are scattered throughout the images of nature. Now, so to place these images, totalized and fitted to the limits of the human mind, as to elicit from, and to superinduce upon, the forms themselves the moral reflections to which they approximate, to make the external internal, the internal external, to make nature thought, and thought nature—this is the mystery of genius in the fine arts. Dare I add that the genius must act on the feeling, that body is but a striving to become mind—that it is mind in its essence?
In every work of art there is a reconcilement of the external with the internal; the conscious is so impressed on the unconscious as to appear in it; as compared mere letters inscribed on a tomb with figures themselves constituting the tomb. He who combines the two is the man of genius; and for that reason he must partake of both. Hence there is in genius itself an unconscious activity; nay, that is the genius in the man of genius. And this is the true exposition of the rule that the artist must first eloign himself from nature in order to return to her with full effect. Why this? Because if he were to begin by mere painful copying, he would produce masks only, not forms breathing life. He must out of his own mind create forms according to the severe laws of the intellect, in order to generate in himself that co-ordination of freedom and law, that involution of obedience in the prescript, and of prescript in the impulse to obey, which assimilates him to nature, and enables him to understand her. He merely absents himself for a season from her, that his own spirit, which has the same ground with nature, may learn her unspoken language in its main radicals, before he approaches to her endless compositions of them. Yes, not to acquire cold notions—lifeless technical rules—but living and life-producing ideas, which shall contain their own evidence, the certainty that they are essentially one with the germinal causes in nature—his consciousness being the focus and mirror of both—for this does the artist for a time abandon the external real in order to return to it with a complete sympathy with its internal and actual. For of all we see, hear, feel, and touch the substance is and must be in ourselves; and therefore there is no alternative in reason between the dreary (and thank heaven! almost impossible) belief that everything around us is but a phantom, or that the life which is in us is in them likewise; and that to know is to resemble, when we speak of objects out of ourselves, even as within ourselves to learn is, according to Plato, only to recollect;—the only effective answer to which, that I have been fortunate to meet with, is that which Pope has consecrated for future use in the line—
“And coxcombs vanquish Berkeley with a grin!”
The artist must imitate that which is within the thing, that which is active through form and figure, and discourses to us by symbols—the Natur-geist, or spirit of nature, as we unconsciously imitate those whom we love; for so only can he hope to produce any work truly natural in the object and truly human in the effect. The idea which puts the form together cannot itself be the form. It is above form, and is its essence, the universal in the individual, or the individuality itself—the glance and the exponent of the indwelling power.
Each thing that lives has its moment of self-exposition, and so has each period of each thing, if we remove the disturbing forces of accident. To do this is the business of ideal art, whether in images of childhood, youth, or age, in man or in woman. Hence a good portrait is the abstract of the personal; it is not the likeness for actual comparison, but for recollection. This explains why the likeness of a very good portrait is not always recognized; because some persons never abstract, and among these are especially to be numbered the near relations and friends of the subject, in consequence of the constant pressure and check exercised on their minds by the actual presence of the original. And each thing that only appears to live has also its possible position of relation to life, as nature herself testifies, who, where she cannot be, prophesies her being in the crystallized metal, or the inhaling plant.
The charm, the indispensable requisite, of sculpture is unity of effect. But painting rests in a material remoter from nature, and its compass is therefore greater. Light and shade give external, as well internal, being even with all its accidents, while sculpture is confined to the latter. And here I may observe that the subjects chosen for works of art, whether in sculpture or painting, should be such as really are capable of being expressed and conveyed within the limits of those arts. Moreover, they ought to be such as will affect the spectator by their truth, their beauty, or their sublimity, and therefore they may be addressed to the judgment, the senses, or the reason. The peculiarity of the impression which they may make may be derived either from color and form, or from proportion and fitness, or from the excitement of the moral feelings; or all these may be combined. Such works as do combine these sources of effect must have the preference in dignity.
Imitation of the antique may be too exclusive, and may produce an injurious effect on modern sculpture:—first, generally, because such an imitation cannot fail to have a tendency to keep the attention fixed on externals rather than on the thought within;—secondly, because, accordingly, it leads the artist to rest satisfied with that which is always imperfect, namely, bodily form, and circumscribes, his views of mental expression to the ideas of power and grandeur only;—thirdly, because it induces an effort to combine together two incongruous things, that is to say, modern feelings in antique forms;—fourthly, because it speaks in a language, as it were, learned and dead; the tones of which, being unfamiliar, leave the common spectator cold and unimpressed;—and lastly, because it necessarily causes a neglect of thoughts, emotions, and images of profounder interest and more exalted dignity, as motherly, sisterly, and brotherly love, piety, devotion, the divine become human—the Virgin, the Apostle, the Christ. The artist’s principle in the statue of a great man should be the illustration of departed merit; and I cannot but think that a skilful adoption of modern habiliments would, in many instances, give a variety and force of effect which a bigoted adherence to Greek or Roman costume precludes. It is, I believe, from artists finding Greek models unfit for several important modern purposes that we see so many allegorical figures on monuments and elsewhere. Painting was, as it were, a new art, and being unshackled by old models it chose its own subjects, and took an eagle’s flight. And a new field seems opened for modern sculpture in the symbolical expression of the ends of life, as in Guy’s monument, Chantrey’s children in Worcester Cathedral, etc.
Architecture exhibits the greatest extent of the difference from nature which may exist in works of art. It involves all the powers of design, and is sculpture and painting inclusively. It shows the greatness of man, and should at the same time teach him humility.
Music is the most entirely human of the fine arts, and has the fewest analoga in nature. Its first delightfulness is simple accordance with the ear; but it is an associated thing, and recalls the deep emotions of the past with an intellectual sense of proportion. Every human feeling is greater and larger than the exciting cause—a proof, I think, that man is designed for a higher state of existence; and this is deeply implied in music in which there is always something more and beyond the immediate expression.
With regard to works in all the branches of the fine arts, I may remark that the pleasure arising from novelty must of course be allowed its due place and weight. This pleasure consists in the identity of two opposite elements—that is to say, sameness and variety. If in the midst of the variety there be not some fixed object for the attention, the unceasing succession of the variety will prevent the mind from observing the difference of the individual objects; and the only thing remaining will be the succession, which will then produce precisely the same effect as sameness. This we experience when we let the trees or hedges pass before the fixed eye during a rapid movement in a carriage, or, on the other hand, when we suffer a file of soldiers or ranks of men in procession to go on before us without resting the eye on anyone in particular. In order to derive pleasure from the occupation of the mind, the principle of unity must always be present, so that in the midst of the multeity the cetripetal force be never suspended, nor the sense be fatigued by the predominance of the centrifugal force. This unity in multeity I have elsewhere stated as the principle of beauty. It is equally the source of pleasure in variety, and in fact a higher term including both. What is the seclusive or distinguishing term between them?
Remember that there is a difference between form as proceeding, and shape as superinduced;—the latter is either the death or the imprisonment of the thing;—the former is its self-witnessing and self-effected sphere of agency. Art would or should be the abridgment of nature. Now the fullness of nature is without character, as water is purest when without taste, smell, or color; but this is the highest, the apex only—it is not the whole. The object of art is to give the whole ad hominem; hence each step of nature hath its ideal, and hence the possibility of a climax up to the perfect form of a harmonized chaos.
To the idea of life victory or strife is necessary; as virtue consists not simply in the absence of vices, but in the overcoming of them. So it is in beauty. The sight of what is subordinated and conquered heightens the strength and the pleasure; and this should be exhibited by the artist either inclusively in his figure, or else out of it, and beside it to act by way of supplement and contrast. And with a view to this, remark the seeming identity of body and mind in infants, and thence the loveliness of the former; the commencing separation in boyhood, and the struggle of equilibrium in youth: thence onward the body is first simply indifferent; then demanding the translucency of the mind not to be worse than indifferent; and finally all that presents the body as body becoming almost of an excremental nature.
Άλκι Ζαλαβρά, Δοτικό
-
Η κοπέλα ωραία μπουτού διχτυωτήξεκινάει να διασχίσει τον δρόμο με
κατακόκκινογιατί εμπιστεύεται πως η ζωήδεν είναι κάτι τόσο τραγικό να
κινδυνεύει Εγώ στο ...
Καταπάτηση
-
"Η Iστορία είναι ένας εφιάλτης από τον οποίο προσπαθώ να ξυπνήσω" (Τζέημς
Τζόυς)
Ο χρόνος που καλύπτει η Καταπάτηση αρχίζει περίπου από κει που τελειών...
Κάπως έτσι
-
Ας πούμε λοιπόν πως επιστρέφω.
Πώς επιστρέφω;
Ξεκινώντας από το τέλος νομίζω.
Από τη φετινή παράσταση, το φετινό μου ταξίδι:
Η Χώρα, βασισμένη σε κείμενα α...
I had everything I needed to commit suicide
-
*κι όταν η απόσταση μεγάλωνε, σε ονειρευόμουν σε κάτι όνειρα απλοϊκά
χολυγουντιανής αισθητικής· περπατούσαμε, ας πούμε, σε μια προκυμαία γεμάτη
κόσμο με...
Οι Δώδεκα: Μια ημιτελής συμφωνία
-
*Τσαμαδού**. **Στέκι μεταναστών. Πέτρος σκοτάδι ασάλευτο στέκεται ώμους
στο παράθυρο. Δεν βιάζεται σιωπή. Δεν σκέπτεται τη νύκτα άνθρωπος. Κάποτε
μόνο τον...
Ζαχαροπλαστικόν Θαύμα
-
Αγαπητοί μου πιστοί, κι εσείς αγαπητοί μου άπιστοι: για άλλη μια φορά η
Μεγάλη Θεά μας τίμησε με ένα Αληθινό Θαύμα!
Όπως κάθε χρόνο, κατά την Ιεράν Ιεροτε...
μας κρατάν όμηρους
-
και δεν είναι μόνο αυτοί που νομίζεις ξέρεις, με τις στολές και την ηλίθια
φάτσα. είναι πολύ περισσότεροι. είναι όλοι. ______________________
υπάλληλος τρα...
4.Τα δένδρα της πόλης: Παυσίπονο στην τούμπα
-
«Φιλαράκι πάρε κι αυτά για το δρόμο!». Με μια χούφτα χαρτομάντιλα στο δεξί,
μπας και σταματήσει η ρινορραγία και το υπόλοιπο κουτί σόφτεξ δώρο από τον
τα...
Η ΤΕΛΕΥΤΑΙΑ ΑΝΑΡΤΗΣΗ
-
Ο αόρατος οικοδόμος
μέσα στο αυτί μου η πραγματικότητα
βουίζει
σαν ήχος μπετονιέρας
γκρουν και γκρουν
ακούραστη
να ανακατεύει το χαρμάνι
πάντα έ...